On Tuchachevsky - Trotsky Conspiracy Collaboration - Transcripts
Transcripts of the meeting of The Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR June 1-4, 1937
Contents
P1- From the testimony of Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky "Plan of defeat". June 1, 1937
P37- Transcript of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937. Evening session June 1, 1937.
P107- Transcript of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937 (Morning session on June 2, 1937)
P171- Transcript of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937 (Evening session on June 2, 1937)
P239- Transcript of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937 (Morning session on June 3, 1937)
P308- Transcript of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937 (Evening session on June 3, 1937)
P372- Transcript of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR June 1-4, 1937 (Morning session June 4, 1937)
P462- List of persons invited and present at the meetings of the Military Council from 1 to 4 June 1937
Partial
From the testimony of Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky "Plan of defeat". June 1, 1937
A source: Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. June 1-4, 1937: Documents and materials. - M.: Russian political encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2008, p. 61-111
Archive: CA FSB RF. Arch.-trace. case No. R-9000. T. 1.S. 277-316. Script. Autograph.
June 1, 1937 [1]
II. Plan of defeat
The center of the anti-Soviet military-Trotskyist conspiracy carefully studied materials and sources that could answer the question: what are Hitler's operational plans aimed at ensuring the dominance of German fascism in Europe?
The main issue for Germany is the issue of obtaining colonies. Hitler directly stated that Germany would look for colonies and sources of raw materials at the expense of Russia and the states of the Little Entente.
The experience of the war 1914-1918. teaches Germany that without providing itself with basic raw materials, especially iron ore, oil and bread, it is impossible for her to participate in a large and prolonged modern war. All these types of raw materials are in Ukraine and Romania, partly in Czechoslovakia.
If we come to the question of Hitler's possible plans for a war against the USSR, then it can hardly be allowed that Hitler could seriously hope for the defeat of the USSR. The maximum that Hitler can hope for is the severing of certain territories from the USSR. And such a task is very difficult and can only be thought of with any seriousness in the USSR's war on two fronts: in the West and in the Far East. At the same time, the successes of the socialist economy of the USSR from year to year are so great that these limited military objectives of Germany and Japan will soon become generally unrealizable.
So, the Germans will have to set themselves the limited goal of the war - to tear away part of the territory from the USSR and defend the possession of this part of the territory until the end of the war. German military theorists highly value this method of war, considering Frederick the Great (Seven Years' War) to be its creator. This kind of war with a limited purpose is also considered very thoroughly by Clausewitz. It goes without saying that this kind of war with a limited purpose conducts its operations precisely on the territory that it must eventually take over. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the possible theaters of the war of Hitlerite Germany against the USSR from an economic point of view, i.e., in terms of satisfying the colonial appetites of Germany.
The Germans, of course, can easily capture Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and from the occupied bridgehead begin offensive operations against Leningrad, as well as the Leningrad and Kalinin (their western part) regions. Finland is likely to let German troops pass through its territory. The difficulties that the Germans would have encountered in this operation would be as follows: first, the railway network of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is too poor and has too little traffic capacity to accommodate the actions of large forces. It would have required either the investment of large capital in the railways of these countries in peacetime, or the development of these roads during the war, which would greatly fetter and complicate the actions of the German armies. Secondly, The USSR would not have allowed Germany to occupy the Baltic theater with impunity to prepare a base there for a further offensive within the USSR. However, from a military point of view, such a task can be posed, and the question is whether the capture of Leningrad, the Leningrad and Kalinin regions are a real solution to the political and economic task of finding a raw material base. This last question has to be answered in the negative. The seizure of all these territories in Germany will give nothing, except for additional economic troubles. From an economic point of view, the multimillion city Leningrad is a big consumer. The only thing that such a territorial seizure would give Germany is possession of the entire southeastern coast of the Baltic Sea and the elimination of rivalry with the USSR in the navy. In this way, from a military point of view, the result would be great, but from an economic point of view - negligible. The Germans cannot but consider the fact that Leningrad as a center of the war industry no longer plays for us the decisive role that it played before the transfer of the war industry to the east.
The second possible direction of the German intervention in agreement with the Poles is the Belarusian one. It is quite obvious that both the seizure of Belarus and the western region does not give any solution to the raw material problem and therefore is not interesting for Germany. The Belarusian theater of military operations only in this case acquires decisive significance for Germany if Hitler sets himself the task of completely defeating the USSR with a march on Moscow. However, I find this task absolutely fantastic.
The third, Ukrainian direction remains. Strategically, the ways of fighting for Ukraine for Germany are the same as for Belarus, i.e., it is connected with the use of Polish territory. Economically, Ukraine is of exceptional importance for Germany. It solves both metallurgical and grain problems. German capital is making its way to the Black Sea. Even the seizure of the Right-Bank Ukraine alone would have given Germany both bread and iron ore. Thus, Ukraine is the coveted territory that Hitler dreams of as a German colony. The fact that the Germans occupied Ukraine in 1913, but were driven out of there, plays an important role in the aspirations for Ukraine among the German military circles. desire for revenge.
So, the territory that Germany is most likely to fight over is Ukraine. Consequently, in this theater of war, the appearance of the main forces of the German armies is most likely.
Very often there are assumptions that Germany will not want to significantly move her armies from her territory. It depends solely on the political tasks that will be assigned to the army. If this task is to seize Soviet territory, then the German army cannot but strive for this territory.
Only if the political goal of Germany were the limited task of supporting Poland in the war with us, only in this case can it be assumed that the German armies will not go far from their borders. But even in this case, it is necessary to consider the principles of the German General Staff, proved by the course of the war of 1914-1918, that the German General Staff does not engage in politicking, but throws its armies where strategic considerations require. For example, the Germans repeatedly threw their troops into the territory of Austria-Hungary to fight Serbia, Romania and Italy. Therefore, you should not deceive yourself with hopes that the Germans will not go far from their borders.
However, the conclusion that has just been drawn about German intentions about Ukraine is relative. The fact is that even if Germany set itself the task of waging a war with a limited purpose, then this war cannot but turn into a large and long-term war, and at least two fronts would be created: Belarusian and Ukrainian. The USSR is too strong to accept even the slightest territorial concession. A long war with the USSR, of course, could involve both France and England in the war with Germany. In other words, a war, the aim of which is limited to the capture of only Ukraine, turns into a big war, which requires the same preliminary solution of the raw material problem.
Because of this, it seems to me very likely that Germany, before the war with us, will try to seize Czechoslovakia and Romania. A situation in Europe is not excluded when none of the countries will be able to support Czechoslovakia against Germany in time. If only the German attack on Czechoslovakia is supported from the south by a blow from the Hungarian army, which is very likely, then the fate of Czechoslovakia can be resolved very quickly. It should also be considered that German fascist organizations are operating in Czechoslovakia, which can disorganize the country's defense. There is intelligence evidence that the Germans are developing a plan to capture Czechoslovakia within three days. Indeed, the position of Czechoslovakia, stretched from west to east, under attack from the west, north, south and, finally, from within, is extremely difficult.
As for the war of Germany against Romania, from a strategic point of view, the Germans know very well how to occupy the territory of this country. The experience of 1918 by the Germans is well studied.
What can the Germans gain from the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Romania in economic terms? Statistics show that Romania exports exactly the same number of cereals as Germany imports them in peacetime (before Hitler's restrictions). Romania produces, if my memory serves me correctly, 14 million tons of oil. Romania and Czechoslovakia are rich in many metals. Finally, the establishment of German capital in Rumania would mean its monopoly in the Balkans, in Turkey and its exit, again, into the Black Sea. Only iron ore would still be a bottleneck in the German economy and would require the capture of Krivoy Rog region. The possibility is not excluded that the Germans, having correctly set up prospecting for the subsoil, will be able to find iron ore in Romania as well. Thus, the capture of Czechoslovakia and Romania by Germany can do without a big war,
Ultimately, we can conclude that regardless of whether the war against the USSR will be preceded by Germany's war with Czechoslovakia and Romania or not, all the same, the main interests of Nazi Germany are directed towards Ukraine. This should proceed from this; our operational plan should take this into account. However, our operational plan does not take this into account. It is built in the same way as if a war was expected with Poland alone.
Let us now consider our western borders and western theaters of war based on the political task of "hitting the enemy on his territory."
For the next period of time, as long as Czechoslovakia and Romania exist, “to beat the enemy on his territory” practically means to beat the Polish-German forces on Polish territory. This is most likely to be the case. It is unlikely that the Germans will send more than one or two expeditionary corps to the Baltic countries.
The operation must take on decisive significance when bourgeois Poland is to fall with the defeat of the Polish-German forces. Such a battle may take place in the Königsberg-Lvov-Krakow-Danzig region. What are the paths of movement of our armies in order to reach this area in the most advantageous grouping and with the widest encompassing base?
The strategically most advantageous way is the rapid defeat of the invasion armies of the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania so that the exit of our main forces operating north of Polesie to the Konigsberg-Brest-Litovsk line occurs in conditions where these main forces will have a wide covering the rear, ensuring the organization of the most uninterrupted transport and the most convenient combat deployment of aviation at airfields. This option, unfortunately, ran into politically formidable difficulties, namely, that the limitrophes [2] can remain neutral. Since the repetition of "Belgium" is recognized as unacceptable, this plan had to be abandoned. That is why Cork is wrong when he says that the aggressive role of the Balts was sabotaged. On the contrary, an aggressive policy of the Balts would allow us to use the best option for a strategic solution. Not aggression, but neutrality of the Balts thwarted the application of the most decisive plan, and the cancellation was followed not by a departmental military decision, but by a government decision. I will come back to this option in the future, because in connection with the likely attack on us by the Germans and the enormous importance that East Prussia will play in our movement into the interior of Poland, and also considering that we are building a large navy in the Baltic, this option will be even more decisive in the future ...
The neutrality of the Balts plays a very dangerous role for us. If, say, it lasts even only two weeks, then it will also play its harmful role for us. Due to the remaining neutrality, we will have to abandon the most advantageous option, and in two weeks, if neutrality is violated by the Balts, it will be impossible to fix the matter, i.e., impossible in the process of strategic concentration. In the course of operations, of course, much can be rectified. However, reckoning with the political demands for respect for neutrality, it is necessary to look for other, albeit less strategically advantageous, ways.
North of Polesie there is only one way: between Latvia and Lithuania from the north and the wooded-swampy Polesie from the south. This strategic corridor, already narrow, is split longitudinally, as it were, into two parts by the wooded and swampy area of the upper reaches of the Berezina, Nalibakskaya Pushcha, the middle reaches of the Neman and Belovezhskaya Pushcha. In addition, it also has transverse barriers: p. Viliya, or rather the course of the Neman, Neman and Shor in the section Grodno-Slonim, Narev, Yaselda, Western Bug. However, the weakest point of the “Belarusian corridor” is its access to the territory of ethnographic Poland. The armies advancing along this corridor will find themselves in a very difficult situation in the area. I will touch on these provisions.
In vain would we wait, as the General Staff does with us, that the Germans would be the first to violate Lithuania's neutrality. It is not profitable for them. In this case, the Germans would have had too poorly provided rear services in Lithuania. Incidentally, during one of his field trips, it seems in 1911, Moltke, as Forster describes in his book "Behind the scenes of the German General Staff," discussed the possibility of directing the offensive of the German armies from East Prussia in the direction of Vilno and came to the conclusion that this was excluded due to the weakness of the railway network in Lithuania. It is also characteristic that Hitler himself proposed to Lithuania to conclude a non-aggression pact. Thus, since the Germans will not violate the neutrality of Lithuania, our armies will have to face the danger of an attack from the north with their right flank, moving through Grodno and further to the west, from East Prussia. But that's not all. In the event that the main forces of the Belorussian Front cross the Neman near Grodno and further south, the Germans can violate the neutrality of Lithuania, which has any three divisions, and shortly go to the rear of the Belorussian Front in the direction of Kovno-Vilna. If a deep invasion of Belarus through Lithuania would be dangerous for the Germans from the point of view of organizing the rear, then an operation with a short swing is quite natural.
